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CFR–RIIA Interconnections: A Transnational Ruling Class, Liberal Atlantic Community or Anglo-American Establishment?

The CFR and Chatham House were not only intimately connected with a myriad of national establishment societies and organisations, as indicated in Chapter 2, but also with one another. This chapter aims to examine the extent and nature of such interconnections from 1919 to 1945. It will be seen that the connections between the two internationalist think tanks were many and varied, ranging from personal correspondence, cooperation in publishing and disseminating literature, exchanges and other visits, joint international conferences and study groups. In addition, of course, they were founded at the same meetings at Paris in 1919–20 and, during the 1920s through the Great Depression to the end of the Second World War, they were financially sustained by the great American philanthropic foundations. However loosely, then, it may be claimed that the leaders of the two think tanks were components of an Anglo-American ‘establishment’.

It is important to bear in mind that certain claims have been made, implicitly and explicitly, about the character of the CFR and Chatham House, their international roles, interconnections, and results in regard to promoting Anglo-American cooperation. This chapter explores four sets of theoretical approaches to this subject: van der Pijl’s transnational capitalist class view, the Gramscian view, the liberal ‘Atlantic community’ view and the statist view.

Rival interpretations

Kees van der Pijl argues that the best explanation of international relations must include an analysis of capitalist ruling class fractions that have

competing (and sometimes common) interests, which develop ideologies and policies to promote global capitalist accumulation. He further argues that capitalism, as a world system, develops international networks – social, economic, ideological – and begins the process of creating a transnational capitalist class. Pijl claims, however, that the state is a key relatively autonomous means by which world order is established and maintained. The *state/society complex* is central to Pijl's claims. Pijl also claims to share the neo-Gramscian outlook of Cox and Gill, with attendant interest in public opinion and mass mobilisations (Pijl, 1998, pp. 3–4).

Pijl analyses a number of antecedents of transnational classes, including freemasonry (Pijl, 1998, pp. 99–106) and the Rhodes–Milner group, evidence of which he takes, somewhat uncritically, from the writings of Carroll Quigley (Quigley, 1981). The Rhodes–Milner group is better known in the present study as 'Milner's Kindergarten', the training ground of several of the men who went on to found Chatham House, including Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr. The Rhodes–Milner group stood for Empire federation and Anglo-American cooperation, and had a number of prominent American members, including Walter Lippmann, Thomas Lamont and Whitney Hart Shepardson. Following Quigley, Pijl claims that this represented a nascent transnational class, representing the interests of particular fractions of capital in London and New York.

On the formation of Chatham House and the CFR, however, Pijl merely argues that a single Anglo-American Institute of International Affairs was 'still-born' because of domestic political considerations but, even more importantly, because of conflicts of financial interests between Wall Street and the City of London. In the 'absence' of evidence, Pijl claims that no intellectual or other meaningful Anglo-American cooperation took place. In the struggle over European war debts and German reparations issues, US money interests (Dawes and Young Plans, for example) prevailed (Pijl, 1998, p. 114). Ultimately, this indicates the *economistic* character of Pijl's outlook, even though he suggests that he takes seriously politics, intellectuals and the state.

For Pijl, the CFR and RIIA were relatively insignificant institutions in the period in question. The only role he assigns is one of some sort of 'sounding-board' role to the CFR, mentioning some participation in the Second World War State Department planning and the Council's '1980s project' of some 30 years later (Pijl, 1998).¹ Chatham House is hardly acknowledged at all, despite its associations with the Round Table and Milner's kindergarten.

From Pijl's theory we may expect there to be *neither meaningful cooperation nor significant interconnections between the two think tanks*.

The Gramscian view, particularly as developed by Cox (1993) and Gill (1990), suggests that there would be international cooperation between private actors, including intellectuals. Working from a theoretical framework which seriously considers economic interests and ideas/ideology as equally important, Gramscians argue that hegemonic historic blocs that prevail nationally also seek to establish their hegemony internationally (Cox, 1993, p. 58). In this quest, it is not only the state but also private elite organisations and actors that engage in building hegemony and alliances with other states and foreign private forces. As Gill argues, private international organisations are forums for state-based and private forces to meet, to 'come to know and influence each other' (Gill, 1990, p. 122). This approach recognises the importance of economic interests at the same time as recognising the equally powerful role of ideas and institutions, that is, of politics.

Consequently, Gramscians recognise the importance of groups such as the CFR and Chatham House as the intellectuals who developed the blueprints for a new world order of international cooperation (Gill, 1990, p. 53). Gill argues that such organisations may be said to belong to an 'international establishment', characterised by 'intersecting domestic establishments' (Gill, 1990, p. 155). According to Gill, the formation of the CFR and Chatham House is part of a process of development of 'private international relations councils' that dates back to the Round Table movement and continued with the Bilderbergers in the 1950s, offering opportunities for networking with other elites across borders, and for uniting 'diverse interests for a common civilisational purpose... [and] to act to absorb political frictions between constituent elements' (Gill, 1990, p. 123). This is especially important when intergovernmental relations may be 'strained'.

Gramscians, therefore, would expect significant interaction between Council and Chatham House, although they would not rule out a certain level of friction, reflecting the 'nationalist' internationalism that characterised the two think tanks.

The differences between the Gramscians and Pijl are not vast but they do reflect the former's greater and more consistent commitment to the equal importance of economic, political and intellectual forces. In both formulations, however, it is clear that the interests served by the actions of private and state forces were principally, though not exclusively, of elites or dominant classes. The third view to be considered here – the liberal view – suggests that the outcomes of international cooperation are more equally distributed, that they serve a broader range of societal and international interests, not primarily those of dominant Anglo-American elites.

The 'liberal Atlantic community', or special relationship, perspective provides a lower level explanation of international relations, specifically of Anglo-American cooperation. This view emphasises factors such as common language, ties of family and religion, a shared literary and political-cultural heritage, and so on (Nicholas, 1963, pp. 22–23). Of course, economic and strategic interests are not entirely absent, but they are generally subordinated to the deeper affinities of Anglo-Saxon peoples (see Chapters 2 and 3). According to Herbert Nicholas, it is difficult to conceive of British policy towards the United States as 'foreign policy', as the relationship is more familial, judged in 'moral, Anglo-Saxon' terms, rather than considerations of power and national interest (Nicholas, 1963, p. 23).

Consequently, *liberals would expect Britain and the United States to cooperate, both at formal and informal, public and private levels, and expect a fair degree of personal correspondence, transatlantic visits, and attempts to build Anglo-American consensus.*

For liberals, such as Herbert Nicholas and H.C. Allen (Allen, 1959, p. 19; Dumbrell, 2001, pp. 9–11), *the aim of such cooperation would be to forge ever closer ties between the peoples, and to promote a common Anglo-Saxon civilisation, as opposed to the less democratic and militarist traditions of Continental and other powers, and world peace and prosperity.* In fact, the liberal perspective bears remarkable similarities to the *self-professed* attitudes of the leaders and members of the Council and Chatham House. Its testing, therefore, permits comparison between the expressed sentiments of think tank leaders and their concrete actions. It is distinguished from the perspectives of Pijl and the Gramscians largely in terms of *motivation and effects*. That is, Marxists attribute the drive for a new Anglo-American alliance and new world order to capitalist self-interest rather than more benevolent and popular factors/pressures; in turn, the effects tend to fortify the positions of the ruling class in economic and global terms.

The statist view, as argued earlier, centres on the autonomy and power of the state to determine political outcomes. From this, *we would expect the evidence to show that the state played a decisive role in creating private group interconnections, especially in the area of foreign affairs, and that the groups were largely instruments of state power.*

This chapter considers the applicability of the above theories to the historical evidence of CFR–RIIA interconnections. The following sections of this chapter begin with indications of the strong personal relationships that existed between the leaders of the two think tanks before going on to describe the more formal means by which they maintained

their fraternal relations. Given the breadth of interconnections between the two think tanks, it becomes clear that there existed a strong establishment with a mission to build an Anglo-American alliance that would be the cornerstone of a new world order. The aim in this chapter is to provide an analysis of the numerous types of CFR–RIIA interconnection, rather than a chronology of such interactions.

Personal correspondence

As one might expect given their numerous educational, social and political similarities, examination of their correspondence reveals the existence of several long-term friendships between leaders of the CFR and Chatham House. Still, such relationships were in themselves insufficient to account for the forging of such close cooperation as occurred,² undermining the ‘special relationship’ perspective.

Given the hardheaded character of the men who led the two organisations, there had to be shared convictions and real, material power that mobilised to achieve outcomes of global proportions. That is, the men of industry, finance and politics, alongside the men of practical knowledge, were not motivated principally by ties of blood and sentiment, but by a hardheaded appreciation of the trajectory of their country in the world scheme of things, of the rising power of the United States and the waning of the Pax Britannica.

Their correspondence, therefore, also took in national interests, foreign policy analysis, the factors of global power, the possibility of Anglo-American cooperation, the construction of international security institutions, and so on. They cooperated because they were constructing a new world order, centred on Anglo-America, in which they were to share power and responsibility and reap fabulous rewards (and burdens).

An examination of Curtis’s correspondence with Whitney Shepardson more than adequately conveys the ‘mixing up’ of the personal and political elements of the relations between Chatham House and the Council. Their correspondence takes in matters that are personal, such as their close years-long friendship, and even the fact that Shepardson’s son chose to write his undergraduate thesis on Curtis’s life and work, entitled, *Lionel Curtis: Commonwealth Builder*.³ Indeed, Shepardson’s wife, Eleanor, was the former (and first-ever) (English) secretary at Chatham House.⁴ Shepardson was Curtis’s principal collaborator in the Paris meetings that led to the formation of the two institutes of international affairs in 1919, intimately connected with the Round Table organisation, a former Rhodes Scholar educated at Balliol.⁵

It is very difficult to disentangle the personal and the political in the case of Curtis and Shepardson. They clearly enjoyed a decades-long personal friendship. It is pretty evident, however, that they were very much inspired by the same ideas, religiosity, elitism of outlook, the desire to live a 'useful' and active life, to bring together 'men of action' with 'men of ideas'. They were also passionately committed to Anglo-American cooperation in the construction of a new world order, an Anglo-Saxon foundation for global peace, stability and prosperity. That is, their personal friendship was the superstructure supported by their shared ideas and ideals as to the future means of 'saving' the world.

Their correspondence, on the whole, reflects two men's dealings with the world. They also provided each other letters of introduction in order to smooth each other's path to meeting influential people in their own country. They discussed the affairs of Chatham House and the Council, the promotion of each other's foreign policy ideas in their respective countries and the politics of Anglo-American relations.⁶ For his own part, Curtis also utilised Shepardson to introduce other Chatham House men to American men of power.⁷

On other occasions, Shepardson extolled the virtues of the friendship between Ivion Macadam of Chatham House with officials at the Council, especially Walter Mallory and Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Such relations permitted the foreign affairs institutes to share information and experiences.⁸ Such interconnections also led to the perception that both institutes would enjoy benefits, especially from the wealthy American foundations. Shepardson firmly believed that the fact that Chatham House was so valued by the Rockefeller Foundation would lead to some kind of 'indirect advantage' to the Council.⁹ In addition, Chatham House tried to 'learn' from the experience of the Council's regional Committees on Foreign Relations in order to better administer their own branch-building programme.¹⁰

Shepardson and Curtis worked effectively also to promote each other's books. For example, Shepardson wrote a supportive review of Curtis's book, *Civitas Dei*, in *Foreign Affairs* in April 1938. Later, in 1939, Shepardson eagerly informed Curtis that the publishers of *Civitas Dei* were using the similarities between its thesis and that of Streit's Federal Union, to further promote the former's sales.¹¹ In turn, Curtis did his best to urge the publication of a book of Shepardson's speeches, 'by hook or by crook', in Britain, and the transmission of final proofs to the RIIA's FRPS 'for study and submission to His Majesty's Government'.¹²

On a more 'political' note, Curtis and Shepardson were intimately involved in promoting Philip Kerr's (Lord Lothian) position as ambassador

to the United States. In addition to Lothian's own long-lived American connections, Shepardson, as Kerr's closest American friend, eased Kerr's passage into certain sections of American east coast society.¹³ Other east coast elites, such as Thomas W. Lamont and Norman H. Davis, head of the American Red Cross and confidant of both President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, also assisted Lothian. Lamont attempted to smooth US press attitudes towards Britain by arranging private meals between them and Lothian.¹⁴ Lamont even reserved a private apartment in New York City for the exclusive use of the ambassador.¹⁵

Upon Lothian's untimely death, Curtis urged Lord Halifax to replace his old collaborator and friend in Washington, DC.¹⁶ The very following day, Shepardson cabled Curtis to ensure that 'a good man' replaced Lothian. Curiously, Shepardson's cable asked for a man 'honestly free of class consciousness and not too deeply attached conservative doctrine also a proud patriot and a tireless fighter'.¹⁷ Curtis, through his connection with Chatham House Council member and Foreign Office senior official, Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, relayed Shepardson's cable, with a letter of his own, to Halifax, urging him to put himself forward for the job. Curtis noted a few days later that Shepardson's cable 'may have tipped the scale against a decision which might possibly have lost us the war',¹⁸ though he declined to mention any other candidates for the post. Before the end of December 1940, Halifax was appointed ambassador and set off for Washington, DC, with a letter of introduction to Shepardson and a brief history of the CFR–RIIA.¹⁹ Curtis also urged a very willing Shepardson to meet with Halifax, which he did, with positive results, including an 'off the record' talk at the CFR.²⁰

Curtis was also in close contact with Clarence Streit, the former American journalist, who had popularised the idea of federal union between the United States and Britain (Streit, 1939, 1941). As noted earlier, Streit's and Curtis's ideas were complementary, helping spawn a transatlantic, though primarily Anglo-American, movement.²¹ Curtis believed that his *Civitas Dei* [Kingdom of God] provided 'the deeper foundations upon which Streit's bolder proposals rest. The two books are strangely complementary... his book comes at exactly the right moment.'²²

Acutely aware of the negative political repercussions, Curtis declined to write the preface to the British edition of Streit's book, fearing the consequences should 'the Borah's and Johnsons and Howes [US isolationists]... put it about that your thinking is inspired by British propagandists [sic]?'²³

The Anglo-Saxonist character of federal union ideas was not always only implicit. As the Archbishop of Brisbane wrote to Curtis that just

‘as Providence made us first to realise what is meant by “the white man’s burden”, so Providence may now be calling us to lead the way to a new world order’.²⁴ Numerous contemporaries of Curtis’s, including Chatham House colleagues, criticised the racial character of federal unionism, but to no avail. Hugh Wyndham, for example, argued that federalism had done nothing for the black people of North America and South Africa, and that the plans looked like a ‘great blonde beast’ bent on ‘power politics’.²⁵

Clarence Streit’s movement was closely linked with several leaders of the CFR, including Shepardson and Lamont. John Foster Dulles, in his personal/political correspondence with Curtis, emphasised ‘the possibility of developing, as between the democratic and Anglo-Saxon peoples or some elements of them, an organic relationship...’.²⁶ The proponents of federalism, in CFR–RIIA circles, were deeply inspired by what they believed to be the redemptive power of Anglo-Saxon civilisation, the only force capable of saving the world from totalitarianism.

Curtis was at the centre of an Anglo-American pro-federalist campaign in the very late 1930s. He propagandised political parties, influential journalists and religious organisations. His links with the Pilgrims Trust, with Dulles and the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ (and, later, its Commission for a Just and Durable Peace) and with the American columnists Dorothy Thompson and Walter Lippmann, were fully exploited in the cause of Anglo-American alliance.²⁷ Curtis also urged Lothian, as ambassador to the USA, to help Streit refine his ideas so that India and, by extension, other ‘coloured or Asiatic’ nations, would not be offended by the racially exclusive character of federal union.²⁸ Lothian also met with other like-minded individuals, such as George Catlin, the author of *Anglo-Saxony and its Traditions*, which claimed to share the ideas of Streit and ‘owe[d] a debt to Lionel Curtis’. Catlin’s ideas were openly Anglo-Saxonist.²⁹

Lothian, despite publicly declaring, partly due to friendly advice from American friends,³⁰ against British propaganda in the United States, was very closely connected to numerous individuals who supported American aid to the Allies, including the CFR’s own Century Group (see Chapter 6). Desperate to receive an accurate assessment of Britain’s war requirements, the Century Group, with encouragement from Aubrey Morgan, of the British Library of Information in New York contacted Lothian.³¹ Lothian suggested a lunch-meeting with Van Dusen (who represented the Century Group)³², and subsequently, the latter sent Lothian notes of Group meetings, outlining their propaganda campaign, upcoming meetings with Republican leader, Wendell Willkie, and with Secretary of

State, Hull, and the prospect of further meetings with the ambassador through the person of Whitney Shepardson.³³

An initial meeting between Helen Hill Miller, who was an ‘unofficial’ associate of the Century Group, and Lothian was kept secret to protect the ambassador and the Group, as the latter ‘had no authority whatever for dealing with the British Government’. Lothian also supplied information to the Group through the Hollywood scriptwriter, former London correspondent of the *New York World* and Century Group member, John L. Balderston. Balderston received direct intelligence from Lothian and used it in ‘regular newsletter’ releases to the entire American press. Helen Hill Miller had known Lothian since Oxford, where Francis Miller had been a Rhodes Scholar. Once again, the shared political interest in aiding Britain was cemented by long-standing transatlantic social ties.³⁴

Lothian supplied the Century Group with two ‘private and confidential’ memoranda on ‘British Defense [sic]’ and ‘on needs of Great Britain’ in late July and early August 1940, respectively. In the first memorandum, Lothian outlined Britain’s lack of naval destroyers and flying boats and the negative impact on Britain’s ability ‘to repel an invasion ...’.³⁵ The second memorandum gave direct advice and suggestions for political changes *within* the United States, citing the sections of the Neutrality Acts that prevented the flow of American persons, goods and loans to the Allies. The memorandum urged the ‘Adoption of a status of no-belligerency instead of formal neutrality’, because it would provide ‘Great moral encouragement to Great Britain’ and also facilitate Neutrality and other Acts’ repeal, including a 1917 law forbidding the sale of warships.³⁶ In addition, Lothian helped the Century Group to initiate a programme of speeches by visiting British speakers as well as a series of British radio broadcasts to American audiences (Chadwin, 1968, p. 94). After the ‘destroyers-for-bases’ deal was announced, Curtis sent his ‘Hearty congratulations’ to his old friend, Lothian.³⁷

One of Lothian’s closest American associates was Thomas W. Lamont, who had first met Lothian and Curtis at Paris in 1919, where Lamont was an economic adviser to President Wilson. Keen to promote Anglo-American cooperation, Lamont was only too aware of the political sensitivity of his JP Morgan partner status, especially given the congressional hearings of the 1930s that had linked that firm with dragging the US into the First World War because of its own financial interests. Not only was that theme promoted by American isolationists but also by German propaganda.³⁸ Lamont was, therefore, somewhat reticent to be seen to be publicly associated with any movements that suggested pro-British feeling.³⁹

Lamont played a 'behind-the-scenes' role in CDAAA. He assisted CDAAA financially, made suggestions for pamphlets, commented on publicity material, and even edited important statements in order to make them more 'cohesive' or 'stirring'.⁴⁰ So secret was Lamont's participation that Robert Sherwood, the playwright and confidant of FDR, was totally unaware of his role. Sherwood even solicited Lamont's support for CDAAA in a private letter to him.⁴¹ William Allen White, who had made an urgent request to CDAAA to steer clear of east coast financial institutions, corresponded with Lamont on a regular basis, gaining his consent to serve on a 'special committee' of CDAAA, some kind of ad hoc 'backstage' advisory group.⁴² White wrote to Lamont that he did not think of him as a 'Morgan partner' but as 'a wise man whom I could turn to whenever I needed any facts that you have. So I have written you often in confidence and in terms that might not be understood by carping persons who didn't realize the quality of our relations.'⁴³

Lamont, then, was engaged with Lothian *et al.* on the British side and with pro-Allied groups on the other, helping to smooth the path to Anglo-American cooperation. In addition, Lamont was in frequent contact with the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and with FDR. Indeed, Lamont's part in the recruitment of White to head up the CDAAA was done with the full knowledge and support of the State Department and FDR.⁴⁴

Frank Altschul of Lazard Freres and a founder member of the CFR was an Anglophile and, like Lamont, a tireless worker for better Anglo-American relations (Roberts, 2003). He kept close contact with the Century Group, suggesting that they obtain General Pershing to make a nationwide radio broadcast in favour of the destroyers-bases agreement, and in briefing Wendell Willkie on the same subject (Chadwin, 1968, p. 89). Altschul also acted as adviser to the British Embassy on how to promote their cause in the United States, kept in touch with Lothian, and with the latter's close friend, Robert Brand, a partner at Lazard's in London. Brand had been with Milner in South Africa, a founder of the Round Table movement and Chatham House (Roberts, 2003, p. 4).

It is clear from the evidence cited above that private relationships and long-standing social connections played an important role in Anglo-American cooperation building in the critical years of 1939–41. Individuals linked with the CFR and with Chatham House were at the centre of a number of campaigns for both immediate and long-term change: Shepardson in the selection of a new ambassador, Lothian in the activities of the Century Group (and its sister organisations) and Curtis in the federalist campaigns. While some of the above evidence consists of the informal use of private friendships for political purposes, the next section

considers the role of more formal, official visits facilitated by the two think tanks.

Official visits

Chatham House leaders were frequent visitors to the United States, particularly during the late 1930s and after the beginning of the War. Ivison Macadam, Arnold Toynbee, Charles Webster and Sir Frederick Whyte, for example, made a number of trips to the United States, on which they reported back to Chatham House and the Foreign Office. From the CFR, Whitney Hart Shepardson, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Isaiah Bowman, Alvin Hansen and Henry P. Van Dusen of (CDAAA/FFF) made official and unofficial visits to London, usually as part of the Rockefeller Foundation's Anglo-American scholar-exchange programme.⁴⁵

Ivison Macadam

Macadam visited the United States, with the full support of the British Government,⁴⁶ between 23 August and 13 December 1941, in order 'to find out what intelligent groups throughout the country were thinking about post-war problems'. This was the first of two wartime visits that Macadam made, in part because his American wife lived in Portland, Oregon. It was clear that Chatham House sensed the need for direct information from the United States, in order for them to make more accurate plans for the postwar period.⁴⁷ Macadam's visit, which took in a nationwide speaking tour of numerous organisations, including all 13 of the CFR's regional Committees on Foreign Relations was, therefore, of vital significance.

Macadam also attended, alongside Charles Webster, Geoffrey Crowther and Frederick Whyte, the Conference on North Atlantic Relations, to renew contacts with officials of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation, and to meet with US government officials. The Conference aimed to create a forum for discussions between like-minded Britons and Americans of the importance of Anglo-American cooperation. In the main, there were no 'extreme' American elements present, that is, no isolationists, anti-New Dealers, and so on. The Conference discussed concrete Anglo-American tasks in economic warfare, postwar economic reconstruction and the barriers to political and military collaboration.⁴⁸ The British group's participation at the Conference was funded by a \$1200 grant from the Carnegie Corporation, of which Whitney Shepardson was trustee.⁴⁹ Macadam noted that they had met 'a group

of worthwhile people' including several un-named members of the US administration.⁵⁰

Chatham House records of the numerous other meetings addressed by Macadam, and of the subsequent discussions, suggest that Macadam received a friendly, but not wholly uncritical, welcome. While the League of Women Voters in Portland, Oregon, were impressed by Macadam's 'perfect speech' which neither 'scolded' nor made anyone 'feel inferior' and made everyone 'want to help' Britain,⁵¹ the CFR's regional committees were a little more robust.

The inspiration, and funding, for Macadam's tour of the 13 regional CFR Committees on Foreign Relations came from Arthur W. Page, trustee of the Carnegie Corporation and close associate of the CFR, in consultation with Shepardson and Walter H. Mallory, executive director of the CFR.⁵² Macadam's aims, as reported by the *Houston Post*, were to '... Map Plans for Post-War World', a function that the CFR itself was heavily involved in.⁵³ That was precisely Page's and Shepardson's idea for Macadam: that he should prevent the much-feared post-hostilities 'drifting apart' of USA and Britain, due in part to 'the competition for markets' and the American people's tendency to withdraw military forces once the war is over. Page and Shepardson wanted Macadam to bring home to Americans 'the responsibilities of their strength'.⁵⁴ Lord Halifax, Britain's ambassador in USA, noted that 'Chatham House was in a unique position to explain to these worthwhile groups the sort of problems which we were discussing in London', and for 'London', in turn, to better understand American viewpoints.⁵⁵

According to records of the numerous meetings addressed by Macadam, he argued that Chatham House needed information as to the 'degree of probability that effective cooperation from this country [USA] would be forthcoming' in the postwar period.⁵⁶ It was on this issue that there occurred a degree of friction, underlining not only the uncertainties that persisted in both countries about what the future would hold, but also the functions of groups such as Chatham House and the CFR, as institutions that helped to bring to the surface underlying disputes and disagreements and latent suspicions.

The reports show very clearly that the Council's members were much concerned by several blocks to Anglo-American cooperation: first, some members in Nashville feared that most Americans still favoured isolationism and self-sufficiency, while others felt that memories of the aftermath of the Great War were still alive, and would hinder Anglo-American cooperation. Interestingly, in light of the subsequent Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, others argued that the United States would need

‘a drastic shock of some kind (*preferably* a military one) ... to convince the people that the present conflict is really ours ...’ (Italics added). Others added that Anglo-American cooperation also needed to take into account ‘the fact that’, after the War, ‘England would be our natural economic enemy’.⁵⁷

The meetings in Des Moines and Providence also proved a little less than certain about future cooperation. Macadam faced a number of isolationists in each committee, except for Louisville. While there seemed to be greater faith in American participation in the job of feeding the starving peoples of postwar Europe, there was some dissent on future general economic cooperation and on participation in an international organisation. Overall, however, it seems that committee members were supportive of international joint policing efforts, a world organisation, and cooperation over the problem of Germany. According to the report, ‘A substantial segment of Committee opinion was represented by the general proposition that ... the only program for now and after the war is to plunk for Anglo-American control of the world.’ The two powers already controlled ‘the essential raw materials of world trade, the necessary foundation for a peaceful world order’. Other speakers added that, of the two powers, the leadership role was ‘due the United States if we wanted to take it ...’ and that the USA ought to develop ‘some unifying principle, some idea or aim which will command adherence before any merely practical arrangement ...’.⁵⁸

The views represented above are typical of what Macadam found across the range of the CFR’s regional committees. There was genuine concern at the historical tradition of isolationism, suspicions of British ‘neo-imperialism’, of the cunning imperial power exploiting American resources for selfish ends.⁵⁹ The discussions were always thorough, frank and critical, with none of the certainties of an American assumption of a global policeman role that often comes with hindsight. Nevertheless, there was unanimity that, should America become involved in ‘a shooting war’, the prospects of interventionism in postwar reconstruction and an international organisation would distinctly improve. Macadam was applauded by Committee-men in terms not too dissimilar to those employed by the League of Women Voters: he had been diplomatic, had not assumed that the United States would back Britain, and had often used the phrase, ‘what you may wish to do’.⁶⁰

Macadam’s assessment of the situation in the United States did not differ greatly from that of the men he had addressed. Indeed, he often noted that, with the American shops full of foods and goods virtually unobtainable in Britain, and people taking long holidays and only reading

about the European war, 'it will be a miracle if the United States does come into the war'. Macadam despaired of the position in which the American administration found itself, as the Americans did not 'see the war as their affair . . .'.⁶¹ He had also attended a rather sobering America First-organised mass rally, which acted as 'a useful corrective to the ideas on intervention which one naturally picks up from one's [respectable and worthwhile] friends'.⁶²

Nevertheless, Macadam pursued a hectic programme of meetings and interviews with a range of American elites, drawing a number of conclusions. He believed that the United States, after the War, would take up its 'responsibilities' as a creditor nation and an arsenal of democracy. Additionally, he returned from the USA convinced that Chatham House had a vital role to play in maintaining contact with unofficial American groups interested in postwar planning and in acting as a clearing house between them and government. Macadam met with a number of 'new' people, making special contacts of 'use' to Chatham House, FRPS or the Foreign Office. For example, he was much impressed by the work of Professor Hadley Cantril in studying public opinion at Princeton.⁶³ Macadam was also impressed with the work of Alvin Hansen, the Harvard economist, Special Economic Adviser to the Federal Reserve System and CFR leader of the WPS Programme. He recommended that Chatham House open its doors to Hansen when he was stationed in London as adviser to ambassador John Winant. Macadam advised his secretary that Hansen 'might like to use Whitney's [Shepardson's] room [at Chatham House] as a base for contacting nongovernment groups interested [in] reconstruction'.⁶⁴ In addition, Macadam suggested that a secretary at CH help Hansen to arrange meetings with, among others, Ernest Bevin.⁶⁵

As a result of his visit, the supply of information between Britain and the United States, between the CFR and Chatham House, and between the State Department and the Foreign Office, improved immensely. Macadam had dealt with issues of concern to Committee-men and other Americans, outlined the case for fighting Hitler, and had suggested lines along which future Anglo-American cooperation might take place. He had, thereby, helped to 'iron out' certain frictions, ameliorate some suspicion and allay some fears about the character of future British policy. It was not all 'plain sailing', of course, but Macadam had made real what had been an aim of Chatham House: to help build Anglo-American cooperation. So successful was Macadam's visit that he made another extended visit to USA between November 1943 and February 1944. Meanwhile, Arnold Toynbee made a useful trip to the US in 1942.

Arnold Toynbee

Toynbee's tour of the United States also included addressing meetings of nine of the CFR's regional committees, mainly in the south and west of the country.⁶⁶ He met numerous 'worthwhile groups', including 'editors, lawyers, educators, and other professional people interested in international affairs' (McNeill, 1989, p. 183). He met with CFR leaders and Rockefeller Foundation trustees and officials, and was reported to have done 'an unusually good job with our Foreign Relations Committees ...', according to Mallory.⁶⁷ The visit, made at the suggestion of Whitney Shepardson,⁶⁸ was funded by a grant of \$2500 from the Rockefeller Foundation, via the offices of the CFR.⁶⁹

Shepardson, who was in London as a special assistant to the American ambassador, had informed Toynbee of the work of the CFR within the State Department (that is, about the WPS Project), news which provided the *official* inspiration for Toynbee's American tour. Shepardson, according to Toynbee, had told him that 'there is now a secret Division of the State Department for dealing with peace settlement and reconstruction business and that the part of the Council on Foreign Relations which corresponds to the F.R.P.S. is now working under instructions from the Division [of Special Research]'.⁷⁰ It was decided, therefore, that FRPS ought to try to obtain CFR papers related to WPS. The *original* inspiration, however, may well have been a Peace Aims group (of FRPS) meeting at Balliol College, Oxford, at which Henry P. Van Dusen of the Union Theological Seminary (New York) and of the CFR-led FFF organisation, suggested 'inter-visitation between Britain and America' by Christians.⁷¹

The sensitivity of such 'inter-visitation' was emphasised by Mallory: so far as Toynbee's planned trip to the US was concerned, he should be clear that the CFR's work in the State Department was to be kept 'secret', and any 'collaboration between the two Governments would have to be arranged direct and would have to be carried on through official and semi-official channels'.⁷² Toynbee's aim was to find out as much as possible about the CFR's work in the State Department and establish cooperation so far as possible between 'the two F.R.P.S.'s'.⁷³

From the Foreign Office's perspective, Toynbee was expected to contact only 'worthwhile groups' and not waste his time on public speaking engagements for 'not very valuable audiences'.⁷⁴ It ought to be noted that Toynbee took leave of absence from FRPS and the Foreign Office to undertake his US visit, underlining the political sensitivity of sending such emissaries across the Atlantic at that time.⁷⁵ The whole aim of such secrecy was to prevent arousing isolationists' suspicion that Britain was trying to engage a wholly willing State Department into recruiting

US power behind an imperialist plan to dominate the world. Indeed, Mallory's concerns about direct inter-governmental cooperation were symptomatic of this. Both Chatham House and the CFR were more than willing to engage in unofficial diplomacy and negotiations and research collaboration but wanted the framework to be agreed by the State Department and Foreign Office officials. As Toynbee pointed out to N.B. Ronald of the Foreign Office's North American department, it was up to officials and ministers to negotiate an agreement between the Foreign Office and the State Department, so that on "plain-sailing" [that is, non-controversial] subjects' the FRPS and the WPS Project might exchange ideas and personnel, and provide a mutually beneficial flow of policy and other papers.⁷⁶

Once in the US, during the late summer/autumn of 1942, Toynbee (with Ronald) had two successful meetings with Leo Pasvolsky, head of the Division of Special Research. Pasvolsky responded positively to Toynbee's desire for exchange of ideas, papers, personnel, and topics for discussion, and suggested that Toynbee meet with all FRPS's 'opposite numbers'.⁷⁷ In a very systematic and practical way, Pasvolsky outlined how the FRPS-Division of Special Research collaboration would work. In effect, the two groups would separately draw up lists of 'questions on which the responsible statesmen will have to make decisions' and outline 'the minimum amount of information, on each of these questions, which the statesmen will need in order to make their decisions'.⁷⁸ Although this process was considered as a neutral administrative/bureaucratic exercise, it clearly has political implications: issues and issue-areas could be framed in ways that conformed to the predispositions of the individuals and organisations concerned, permitting significant inputs from unofficial, unrepresentative and unaccountable private interests.

To Pasvolsky, the aim was for the two sides to cooperate in areas of shared concern and to expand the areas of shared concern by bringing to light 'definite points of difficulty'. He wanted to see the tables of contents of the Foreign Office handbooks being prepared by FRPS in case there were issues not dealt with which the State Department considered important. Secondly, after the writing and exchange of drafts, representatives of the two sides might come 'together to try to draft an agreed statement which could be taken as a common factual basis for the eventual negotiations between the responsible British and American statesmen'. So positive was Pasvolsky that he suggested that he and his colleague, Harley Notter, plus other Division members would visit London to further explore this area of collaboration.⁷⁹

Toynbee candidly noted, in the report of his US tour, that he had met a ‘representative cross-section of the leading elements in American life’ rather than ‘the great mass of the American people’. The people he had conversed with and consulted and whose detailed ideas he had considered were, therefore, ‘unrepresentative of the majority of their own countrymen’, a point of great importance when it comes to assessing the theoretical implications of the whole host of CFR–RIIA interconnections outlined in this section of the chapter.⁸⁰

In addition to Pasvolsky, Toynbee had met numerous businessmen, labour and farm representatives, university academics and churchmen associated with the ‘non-pacifist wing of the Protestant Churches’. Apart from addressing the CFR’s regional committees, Toynbee also met with several officers such as Mallory and Armstrong, and close friends of the Council, including Thomas W. Lamont, Professors Jacob Viner, Edwin Gay and Alvin Hansen, Henry Van Dusen and John Foster Dulles.⁸¹

With practically all groups that Toynbee met, India and the related issue of British colonialism were considered the greatest threats to post-war Anglo-American collaboration. Americans considered it ‘urgent’ that Britain move seriously towards genuine self-government in India and the establishment of international administration of the colonies, with a view to eventual independence. Americans were concerned that the reimposition of European colonial rule in south-east Asia would be conducted by American troops, with attendant ‘casualties’: ‘Why should American boys give their lives to re-establish European colonialism?’ was of utmost concern to US public opinion. The history of the Vietnam War shows that concern to have been far-sighted.

Next to the Indian/colonial question, many sections of Americans were suspicious of Britain’s trade and currency policies, according to Toynbee. Many believed that the Ottawa Agreements would be reinstituted after the War, leading to intense Anglo-American rivalry. Toynbee argued that Americans, even those who were ‘intelligent and well-informed’, did not realise that Empire preference was ‘a corollary of the [American] Smoot-Hawley Tariff’, and that Britain would only resurrect Ottawa if there were no other alternatives. According to Toynbee, ‘the chief external determining factor in British trade and currency policy will be the trade and currency policy of the United States’.⁸²

Once again, Chatham House had played a significant role in British foreign policy. Toynbee had established links with new contacts, renewed old ones, created new lines of Anglo-American experts’ cooperation, collaboration between the Foreign Office and the State Department,

brought to the surface important American concerns over Britain's colonies and cemented ties between Chatham House, the Rockefeller Foundation and the CFR. All of this had been accomplished under the auspices of a private visit but was to have significant implications for the British foreign policy process. One could hardly have found a better example of a 'state intellectual'.

Charles Kingsley Webster

Webster probably comes closest to Toynbee in regard to being a 'state intellectual'. He also visited the United States both due to his official position as head of the British Library of Information in New York and, before that, as head of the American Section of FRPS. In the latter respect, Webster visited USA between 31 March and 15 May 1941.⁸³ According to Webster, one of his purposes, in alliance with others, was to 'educate public opinion, especially in the United States, to the permanent and fundamental abandonment of isolationism, and to the acceptance by the American public of a responsibility for creating and maintaining a future world order'.⁸⁴

Webster was very well connected with influential Americans and British diplomats, and was to use such links to 'guide things along the right lines' during his American posting.⁸⁵ Webster's closeness to important east coast elites was confirmed by his election to membership of the Pilgrims of the United States (chaired by Thomas Lamont) in November 1941 and to the Century Club (headquarters of the CFR-led Century Group) in May 1942.⁸⁶ Webster also worked closely (and covertly) with Henry P. Van Dusen in attempting to mobilise Protestant and Roman Catholic opinion behind the Allied cause.⁸⁷

Webster, like Macadam and Toynbee, was a tireless servant of British foreign policy, managing to link up with the CFR, the foundations and a wide range of university academics, private foreign affairs associations and the press, including the *New York Times*, the main west coast newspapers and influential weeklies like *Nation*, *Life* and *New Republic*. He also held meetings with Walter Lippmann, and State Department officials such as Pasvolosky, Herbert Feis, Stanley Hornbeck and Adolph Berle. Among the other contacts that he cultivated were Professor James T. Shotwell, Quincy Wright and John Foster Dulles.⁸⁸

The achievements of Chatham House's visitors to the United States were impressive in the range of elite contacts and the intensity of their engagement with the burning issues of the day. The political effects of such 'inter-visitation' must not be under-estimated. Macadam, Toynbee, Webster and, for that matter, Frederick Whyte and Geoffrey Crowther,⁸⁹

had built individual and organisational links with influential Americans and even participated in mobilising American public opinion. Lothian, as ambassador, had secretly been collaborating with the Century Group and others in promoting the destroyers-bases agreement. Curtis had helped build the case for Anglo-American federation, in alliance with Streit, Lamont and others. There was a clear line of communication and action across the Atlantic, at unofficial, semi-official and official (governmental) levels to increase cooperation and build the ideological, political and organisational basis of a new, Anglo-American-led, world order. Chatham House and the CFR were at the heart of that effort.

American visitors to Britain

America's CFR visitors to Britain were an important, though small, group that included Shepardson, Isaiah Bowman, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Hansen and Van Dusen. Unfortunately, their papers do not fully reveal their activities. Nevertheless, as seen in the mentions of Chatham House connections and correspondence, they played a very important role in providing intelligence, advice and guidance on the evolving character of US policy and public opinion, as well as engaging in direct negotiations over the construction of the UNO.

Whitney Shepardson visited London, at the urging of the Rockefeller Foundation and support from the Foreign Office, to observe the work of FRPS, in spring/summer 1941.⁹⁰ The Rockefeller Foundation granted Shepardson \$3000 to visit London, at Chatham House's invitation, 'to facilitate an understanding among groups on both sides of the Atlantic as to the tendencies and investigations underway'.⁹¹ Toynbee had proposed that Rockefeller fund an Anglo-American scholarly exchange programme, after ensuring, through his various contacts, that the State Department and Foreign Office were supportive of the idea.⁹² On both sides of the Atlantic, the CFR and Rockefeller Foundation were reluctant to move on any proposal unless the State Department had assented.⁹³

Shepardson was introduced to civil servants in the War Cabinet Office and, of course, the Foreign Office, and also met a range of unofficial postwar planning groups.⁹⁴ The occasional references to Shepardson's visit in the correspondence of Toynbee, Webster and the Rockefeller Foundation, suggest that it was very successful. According to one letter, Shepardson 'obtained a picture [of the situation in Britain] which few other people could have obtained in so short a time', and had initiated 'a series of ventures which will further post-war reconstruction in its soundest phases'. In addition, Shepardson's visit had presaged a 'unique

opportunity in the history of great nations', most notably, 'official recognition of determined experts whose opinions would be consolidated and incorporated in such problems as post-war reconstruction'.⁹⁵

Of the other visitors to Britain, the most important was Isaiah Bowman, whose London conversations with Webster, Jebb and others, concerning the new world organisation, were the subject of discussion in Chapter 5. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Alvin Hansen and Henry Van Dusen, as well as a number of other less well-known Council men, visited Chatham House and the Foreign Office, and made contributions to the cementing of ties and the provision of friendly intelligence and advice to the British authorities. In all cases, however, they operated in line with official US policy and with the tacit assent of the State Department. That is, despite the close friendships built over several decades, the shared outlook on world affairs, national interests as expressed by state officials still took precedence over personal relations. However Anglophile were Council men, and pro-American were Chatham House leaders, they still retained ultimate loyalty to 'their' state and were careful to not stray over the line.

In concluding this section of the chapter, it is clear that there were a myriad of Anglo-American interconnections – personal, political and financial – that tied together the CFR and Chatham House. The following section, on joint study groups, shows even more clearly their central role in creating the conditions for Anglo-American harmony.

Joint CFR–RIIA study groups

The myriad of relationships outlined above were strengthened by a continuous stream of speakers from both organisations crossing the Atlantic to address their counterparts and by numerous joint study groups, strengthening Anglo-American relations in key areas. From the late 1920s to the 1950s, Chatham House and the Council organised at least five joint study group initiatives, composed of men drawn from their respective government, business, academic and other communities (Roberts, 2001b). The material considered below further seriously undermines Pijl's thesis that since there was excessive Anglo-American economic and financial rivalry in the 1920s, no authentic other cooperation took place.

Priscilla Roberts provides rich details of the activities of the two organisations in creating the conditions for discussing issues that went to the very heart of Anglo-American controversies in the interwar years, such as naval rivalry (joint study groups of 1928–29), Anglo-American economic competition (1930), war debts, trade practices and currency stabilisation (1936–38). Roberts shows that the Council and Chatham

House ultimately created forums for the discussion of national viewpoints, with a view to providing either a solution or some arrangement with which both powers could live. They did not resolve every question, particularly the vexed one of British war debts: All they hoped to do was to provide a forum in each country where the representatives of the other could be heard (Roberts, 2001b, pp. 34–35).

The overall effects of the joint study groups, meetings, and conferences, were to develop an elite with strong governmental connections that, when it came to war, could be utilised both to mobilise the United States to back the Allies and to prepare the way for postwar Anglo-American cooperation. The next section of this chapter outlines the role of the two think tanks during the War in regard to their joint study group activities, indicating the continuing influence of interwar period practices.

Wartime joint study group

An American–British Group was convened by the CFR between December 1943 and April 1944. Its membership included a number of CFR leaders – Altschul, John W. Davis, Lewis Douglas, Lamont and Mallory – businessmen and government officials. On the British side, members included Ivison Macadam, John Wheeler-Bennett, Michael R. Wright and Sir George Sansom.⁹⁶ The Group's purpose was to bring together British and American officials, with alternating chairmen, in their private capacity as individuals, to discuss a range of issues with a view to coming to 'solutions which the Group as a whole can support'.⁹⁷ This indicates the blurring of lines between officialdom and private individuals: the CFR wanted men who were officials because they brought with them 'the benefit of their especial competence', but to an environment in which they could speak frankly and without fear of compromising confidentiality: Chatham House rules applied.⁹⁸ The clear aim was to get some unofficial assessment of the official position of each government. As Shepardson had noted of an assessment of Robert Brand's, during an earlier joint study group, of what HMG would be willing to pay in settlement of its war debt, 'People like Brand... don't suggest figures unless they have a pretty good idea of the government's view' (Roberts, 2001b, p. 35). Since Shepardson sent on Brand's note to the State Department, it is clear that unofficial views eventually ended up in the hands of officials. In addition, it was noted that the members 'will have in mind... the probable public reaction to any proposal which is suggested'.⁹⁹

The official–private distinction was, in effect, undermined even more by the fact that the Group worked within the terms of official agreements,

such as the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration agreed between the British and United States governments. When it came to discussing the postwar treatment of Germany and Japan, therefore, the Council and Chatham House were exploring questions that their own political leaders were grappling with.¹⁰⁰

The discussions of Germany and Japan revealed fairly similar concerns among both national sub-sections of the Group. They reiterated the need to punish the aggressors, to restore them to their original frontiers, and then to ensure their re-entry into the comity of nations, under the watchful eye of both Britain and the United States but also a new world security organisation. The conclusion of the Group in regard to Japan stands also for Germany. 'The terms imposed upon Japan should not . . . be so vindictive as to undermine the moral foundations of whatever security system we might be able to devise.'¹⁰¹ Later meetings discussed a future world security organisation, the 'Economic and Financial Problems of Mutual Concern to the United Kingdom and the United States', India and the Dependent Areas, and Europe.¹⁰²

Conclusion

The CFR and Chatham House intersected and overlapped, were thoroughly 'mixed up' together. As Geoffrey Crowther, a Chatham House Council member, noted, he was the only member of his family 'without American citizenship'.¹⁰³ There were numerous other intermarriages, familial ties and frequent transatlantic visits. Above all, however, they shared a broad vision of a new world order led by Anglo-American power which they saw as self-evidently beneficent and well intentioned. It was that decades-long-held belief in the Anglo-American salvation of the world that led to the meetings in Paris in 1919, to a new form of organisation scientifically to explore international relations and their respective national interests, and their close cooperation in meetings, study groups and conferences. That is, the men of Chatham House and the Council, while fully paid-up believers in practically all the arguments that make up the 'special relationship' ideal, were ultimately hardheaded proponents of national interest. It was just that they believed that the only way their own country's national interest could be achieved was through international cooperation, open trading systems, international financial institutions and a general security organisation, all based on the solid foundation of an Anglo-American alliance.

Although the dream, especially among the British group, was for a broadly equal relationship between the two countries in the new

world order, it was evident to most of them that America had become the principal factor in world power, at least in terms of Britain's survival in the early phases of the War. It was American public and, to an extent, elite opinion, money and men that needed mobilisation. A stream of visitors from Chatham House, therefore, flowed to the United States in search of those valuable resources. There were American visitors to Chatham House as well but their mission was far less critical.

The empirical interconnections between the two think tanks have been shown. It remains now to evaluate the hypotheses promoted by rival schools against the evidence presented.

The evidence shows significant CFR–RIIA cooperation and interconnections in the period under review. It also shows their connections with the business, academic and governmental communities. The Pijl hypothesis, therefore, does not explain the evidence, as it predicted that there would be little or no significant cooperation and interconnections. The main problem appears to be that, given the relative lack of secondary literature on this question, Pijl falls back on his basically economistic outlook, his focus on inter-capitalist rivalries between 'Wall Street' and the 'City'. The evidence shows that the two think tanks were fully aware of such rivalries, plus numerous others, but worked to air them in closed elite circles, to try to minimise their impact. The evidence suggests that active intellectuals, from many walks of elite life, including big business, made an important contribution to discussing issues that their official political leaders found too sensitive, or discussed issues in advance of their becoming problems for political action, or considered problems from first principles as opposed to an ad hoc manner. Pijl's economism prevents him from fully utilising the Gramscian element of his thought, thereby missing a very important element of interwar political history. Pijl's neglect of CFR–RIIA cooperation stands in contrast to the attention paid to freemasonry, the Round Table movement and the cold war era Bilderbergers. CFR–RIIA interconnections are passed over largely because Pijl prioritises Anglo-American economic and financial rivalries and competition as the prime movers of interwar history. The evidence, however, does not sustain an argument that prioritises economic determinism. That is not to imply that economic interests were not a vital part of postwar planning by the British and American states and their respective elite think tanks. It is to argue that while economic concerns were important, and were interconnected and enmeshed in arguments about stability, security and global order and peace, the latter concerns cannot be reduced to mere epiphenomena. From what Pijl has explicitly argued, the roles of the two think tanks were insignificant.

It may still be possible, however, to *utilise* the evidence of RIIA–CFR cooperation and interconnections to shore up Pijl's analysis. Working on the plurality of interests represented by various 'fractions' of the ruling class, it would be possible for certain sections to engage in Anglo-American cooperation while others rejected it. So, while the City and Wall Street may have not seen eye to eye, it would be entirely possible for ideological/intellectual institutions, which can think more broadly of the changing patterns of world power. The CFR and RIIA, therefore, while being strongly connected with their respective national financial interests, could rise above specific interests and operate as the 'collective intellectual', along Gramscian lines. In short, the evidence of cooperation violates Pijl's neglect of the CFR and RIIA: it need not necessarily invalidate his overall analysis.¹⁰⁴

For this to be the case, however, Pijl would need to apply Gramscian thought more consistently in his analysis, shedding the undue focus on economic interests that inspires most of his work. A Gramscian analysis of the 1920s and 1930s shows that within a particular hegemony (of US isolationism, narrow nationalism, parochialism, and competition and rivalry), there are also the seeds of a new order being sown and nurtured by men and women dedicated to regime change, the forces representing a new historic bloc developing a new hegemonic project of globalism and Anglo-Americanism.

The 'special relationship' view of Anglo-American relations and Chatham House–CFR relations has much to commend it in light of the evidence above. Its main problem is that it ultimately implies two things: first, that the relationship is principally predicated on historical, linguistic and ethnic ties, with a minor role for economic and strategic factors, that is, national self-interest; and secondly, that the relationship was motivated by the desire to benefit the whole world, that the US and Britain, the Council and Chatham House, were merely the instruments for achieving that greater good. While it is not to be doubted that many good things emerged from the relationship, it is clear that the relationship was not designed to benefit the whole world, that Anglo-American power to determine the fate of the world was its principal motivation. Domestically, the think tanks pursued policies that focused mainly on elite interests and aspirations. 'The people' rarely entered their concrete activities. 'The people' were often the objects of their actions or the barriers to a new world order: but they were never consulted or represented in the halls of the Council or Chatham House. In short, for an explanation that is founded on the attachments of the 'two peoples', it fails to account for the fact that 'the peoples' were entirely excluded from the

two organisations that played such a great part in building an alliance between the two nations. This view excludes a proper analysis of elites and elite power in liberal democracies and the role of the ‘masses’. When Chatham House and CFR elites referred to ‘the people’, they actually meant ‘we elites’.

The statist view finds some evidence to support its state autonomy perspective. The actions of the two think tanks’ leaders were carried out in full coordination and consultation with their respective states. On occasion, certain actions were *not* carried out on the basis of advice from state managers. Think tanks’ leaders established their agendas for research and discussion often on the basis of advice received from their political leaders or they based their discussions on the basis of past inter-governmental agreements, such as the Atlantic Charter. All this suggests that the statist view explains much. However, there are also a number of shortcomings. The level, range and intensity of private individuals’ and organisations’ engagement with the issues are beyond statism’s explanation. Secondly, statism does not explain the cooperative character of the state–private group relationship, as its understanding of power is zero-sum, of ‘power over’ not ‘power with’, that is, in cooperation with extra-state forces. It does not tell us why those groups acted as they did, at their own expense and time, and without any guarantees that their work would be taken seriously. Statism, therefore, provides only a partial explanation of the evidence.

Clearly, the Gramscian view is the one accepted here as best explaining the historical evidence. It captures the intellectual elements of the activities of the think tanks, their other connections with the state and the academic and business communities, their ‘ideology’ of ‘public service’, and their focus on policymaking and on opinion mobilisation.

Godfrey Hodgson’s analysis of the ‘foreign policy establishment’ is appropriate. He notes what the originator of the concept, Henry Fairlie, meant by it: men who were non-partisan, well known to each other if not to the general public, ‘who share assumptions so deep that they do not need to be articulated . . .’ and ‘who contrive to wield power outside the constitutional or political forms . . .’ (Hodgson, 1972–73, p. 5). Hodgson’s own definition more than qualifies the CFR and, indeed, Chatham House, as linchpins of the Anglo-American establishment. Hodgson argues that the establishment is defined by ‘a history, a policy, an aspiration, an instinct, and a technique’. In practically every regard, this definition captures the interconnections between the two think tanks. *Historically*, Hodgson pinpoints the First and the Second World Wars as the crucibles for establishment-creation, for bringing together the lawyers, businessmen,

government officials and academics. Its *policy* was defeating isolationism and promoting liberal internationalism. Its *aspiration* was 'quite simply to the moral and political leadership of the world'. Its instinct was always centrist, 'moderate', reasonable, 'avoiding ideology and steering the middle course...'. Its *technique* is to work 'out of the public eye' and through mobilising opinion and through influencing government (Hodgson, 1972–73, pp. 8–13).

In effect, there was an establishment that united around a concept of a new world order based on Anglo-American power. The establishment mobilised its tremendous resources in both the countries to achieve its ends, which generally required undermining the ideological/intellectual base of the old order of isolationism and diehard imperialism, of the parties and institutions that fostered it, and the construction of the new hegemonic project and its historical bloc of forces. Chatham House and the CFR were vital elements of that process, as 'state-spirited' private actors.